Scalia on retirees losing their health insurance: “I can’t feel bad about it.”

By Trevor Boeckmann

AFJ Dorot Fellow

It’s no surprise to see the majority on the United States Supreme Court siding against consumers, employees, and everyday Americans. In the past, we’ve told you about the Court upholding forced arbitration clauses that keep those harmed by big businesses out of court, preventing women from banding together to stop employment discrimination, and allowing employers to impose their religious views on employees.

At some point, one would think the majority would start to feel bad about how their actions affect us. Apparently not.

This week, the Court heard oral arguments in a case involving health insurance for retirees.

 M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett involves a chemical company in West Virginia that had a series of collective bargaining agreements with its employees’ union. At issue was a clause in the agreement that said retired employees “will receive a full company contribution towards the cost of [health] benefits.” The union argued the benefits were guaranteed for life. The company argued it could take away these benefits whenever it chose—which it did in 2007.

As Professors Susan Cancelosi and Charlotte Garden wrote in a previous post: “The equitable case for retirees is compelling: they devoted their working lives to their employer with the expectation that they would then have health insurance to see them through their retirement.” Compelling, unless you’re Justice Antonin Scalia.

During oral argument, Justice Scalia mused:

 You know, the nice thing about a contract case of this sort is you can’t feel bad about it.  Whoever loses deserves to lose. I mean, this thing [the duration of the health benefits] is obviously an important feature.  Both sides knew it was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it could have been said very clearly in the contract.  Such an important feature.  So I hope we’ll get it right, but, you know, I can’t feel bad about it.

 Justice Stephen Breyer was quick to disagree:

Well, you know, the workers who discover they’ve been retired for five years and don’t have any health benefits might feel a little bad about it.

Listen to the comments of Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer:

This is nothing new for Justice Scalia.  Last year, he compared the LGBT community to “child abusers” and referred to the Voting Rights Acts as a “perpetuation of racial entitlement.”

And if the majority sides with the chemical company, that won’t be anything new either.

GUEST BLOG: Does Congress have authority to set voter qualifications for federal elections?

By Franita Tolson, 
Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights at
Florida State University College of Law

In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) preempted Arizona’s Proposition 200, which required documentary proof of U.S. citizenship to register to vote in federal elections.  The NVRA, which provides that all states must “accept and use” a uniform federal form to register individuals to vote, requires only that individuals attest to U.S. citizenship, but does not require documentary proof.

Prof. Franita Tolson

On the surface, the Court’s decision appears to vindicate federal authority by recognizing Congress’s broad power under the Elections Clause to regulate federal elections.  Pursuant to the Clause, states may choose the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but this authority is subject to Congress’s power to “at any time make or alter such Regulations.”  According to the Court, Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause is not subject to the usual presumption against preemption, where the Court assumes that Congress does not intend to preempt state authority in enacting legislation absent explicit language to the contrary.  Rather, Congress’s authority to “make or alter” state legislation pursuant to the Elections Clause is, by definition, an intent to preempt.  Thus, Arizona’s additional requirement for voter registration must give way to the NVRA’s less onerous registration regime for federal elections.

However, buried in this apparent victory for federal authority is language that should alarm voting rights groups while comforting the most ardent advocates of states’ rights.  Although the Court rejected Arizona’s argument that the federal form would not allow the state to collect the information it deemed necessary to assess citizenship status, the Court did so while agreeing with Arizona that the states, and not Congress, have plenary authority over prescribing voting qualifications.  According to the Court, the Elections Clause, which is limited to setting the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding elections,” confers no authority on Congress “to make or alter” voter qualifications.  Instead, these qualifications are linked to the state franchise by various provisions of the Constitution, including Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 (providing that electors for the House of Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) and the Seventeenth Amendment (the same provision, but for the election of senators).  As commentators such as Rick Hasen, Marty Lederman, and Spencer Overton have observed, this narrow view of congressional authority appears to call into question several significant pieces of federal legislation, and it limits Congress’s ability to address state felon disenfranchisement laws.  In addition, it casts doubt on the validity of the Court’s 1970 decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, which held that Congress could lower the voting age to 18 in federal, but not state, elections.

These are not the only landmines lurking in the decision.  Indeed, the most troubling aspect of the majority opinion is that it appears to tell a compelling narrative about the scope of congressional authority over elections, a narrative based firmly in the constitutional text.  In reality, this narrative is woefully incomplete.  It is true, as the Court contends, that Congress’s authority over voter qualifications for state and federal elections is not plenary, but the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments significantly expanded congressional authority over voter qualifications in both state and federal elections.  In particular, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to reduce a state’s representation in the House of Representatives for abridging the right to vote in state and federal elections for “any reason except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits states from abridging the right to vote on the basis of race.  Congress has significant authority to alter voter qualifications pursuant to their enforcement authority under these Amendments, both of which give Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  In some circumstances, requiring additional documentary evidence of citizenship, contrary to federal requirements, could be characterized as an “abridgment” of the right to vote under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore subject to regulation under section 5 of that Amendment.  Similarly, adducing additional evidence of citizenship could have a disproportionate impact on certain minority groups, leading Congress to use its authority under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to bar this additional requirement.

In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, the Court rightly recognizes that the area of voting and elections is unique, but completely misses that the story of the Elections Clause has to be told in light of the Reconstruction Amendments and expanded congressional authority over voter qualifications.                

Franita Tolson is the Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights at the Florida State University College of Law.  Read her previous posts for Justice Watch

Scalia’s latest: Unethical or merely appalling?

We’ve all seen it before:

• Justice Antonin Scalia makes comments that are appalling in their racial insensitivity.
• Justice Antonin Scalia skates right up to the line of ethical impropriety.

But this time Scalia managed to do both at once, while discussing the Voting Rights Act in remarks at the University of California Washington Center this week.

Justice Antonin Scalia

Even as Scalia and his colleagues consider a challenge to a key provision of that law, Scalia chose this forum to elaborate on a claim he first raised during oral arguments, when he called the law a “perpetuation of racial entitlement.”  This week, he echoed that claim, calling the law an “embedded” form of “racial preferment.”

To support his claim he declared that that it was unfair for his current home state, Virginia, to have to clear changes to its voting laws with the Justice Department in advance when other states did not.  He suggested that there could not possibly be a racial bias problem in Virginia since that state once elected a black governor and most other states haven’t.  He neglected to mention the state’s far more recent efforts to suppress the votes of the poor and people of color through restrictive voter I.D. laws.  (We have more on the need for the Voting Rights Act on our website here.)

But most disturbing was this.  According to The Wall Street Journal, Scalia said that:

merely holding minority status should not insulate one from majoritarian policy choices. “Child abusers” are a minority, for instance, but they should not receive special protection as a result, he said.

Presumably, Scalia thought this hypothetical would bolster his efforts to deny equal protection to a whole slew of Americans – such as women, the mentally ill, and the LGBT community.

There is one crucial difference between making such callous, insensitive remarks during oral argument and making such callous, insensitive remarks elsewhere while the case is pending: judicial ethics.

We have long argued that the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, which applies to all other federal judges, should apply to Supreme Court Justices as well.  It was the topic of this brief AFJ documentary:


But since it does not, Scalia is off the hook no matter what.

If Scalia’s remarks had been uttered by a judge on whom the code is binding, they may very well have been in violation of the code – and at the very least would come right up to the edge of what is permissible.  The code says:

A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. [Canon 3A(6).]

Although the code makes an exception for “scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal education,” the commentary to this part of the code advises judges commenting on cases from their own court to “take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality … .”

That’s because the code prohibits conduct that gives even the appearance of impropriety. [Canon 2A.] 

This is not the first time Justice Scalia’s behavior has raised questions about ethics.

• At the same event this week, Justice Scalia indicated his likely vote on another pending case involving the powers of the Federal Communications Commission. 
• In 2011, Justices Scalia and Thomas spoke at a fundraising event for the ultra-conservative Federalist Society.  While federal judges subject to the Code of Conduct can speak to any organization they want, the code bars them from speaking at fundraisers.  Justice Samuel Alito spoke at the same event last year. 
• As we noted in our report on Supreme Court ethics, Justices Scalia and Thomas reportedly have each attended at least one invitation-only retreat hosted by Charles and David Koch, co-owners of Koch Industries, the second largest private corporation in the United States.  The purpose of the Koch retreats is overtly political.

Whether Scalia crossed the line this time or just came very, very close, with each passing year it becomes more urgent to make Scalia, Thomas, Alito and all the other Justices subject to the code of conduct.

The Justice doth protest too much

You can listen to the comments from Justice Scalia described in this post here:



Just before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two marriage equality cases, New York Times Editorial Writer Dorothy Samuels wrote that

there are two questions preoccupying legal writers: How will Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court’s wild card, vote, and how will Justice Antonin Scalia behave? … Can Justice Scalia hold his ego and intemperance in check for the two hour and 50 minute duration of the two marriage argumentss? 

Justice Scalia did seem to choose his words more carefully than he has in some other recent cases – perhaps because he knows that, as Samuels wrote, his increasingly intemperate remarks both on the bench and off are raising questions about whether he should recuse himself from cases like these.

But that didn’t stop Scalia both from getting distorting reality and straining credulity.

It happened during oral argument on Hollingsworth v. Perry, the case challenging Proposition 8, which bans same-sex marriage in California.  Charles Cooper, counsel for supporters of Proposition 8, was struggling to name any actual harm caused by same-sex marriage.  So Justice Scalia tried to help him out, declaring:  

Justice Antonin Scalia

I don't know why you don't mention some concrete things. If you redefine marriage to include same-sex couples, you must -- you must permit adoption by same-sex couples, and there's -­ there's considerable disagreement among -- among sociologists as to what the consequences of raising a child in a -- in a single-sex family, whether that is harmful to the child or not. … I take no position on whether [same-sex marriage is] harmful or not, but it is certainly true that -- that there's no scientific answer to that question at this point in time.

Scalia is wrong.  As Prof. Clifford Rosky pointed out in his guest post to this blog: 

we now have several dozen empirical studies on children raised by lesbian and gay parents conducted over a period of several decades. While no study’s methodology is perfect, the findings of these studies speak with one voice. As one expert testified during the Prop 8 trial, these studies have shown “very conclusively that children who are raised by gay and lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents.

 Indeed, after a four-year review of the scientific literature, the American Academy of Pediatrics declared its support for same-sex marriage.  But what do pediatricians know about children anyway?  It’s the sociologists who count, right?

But, as Ezra Klein notes in The Washington Post, the American Sociological Association also strongly supports same-sex marriage.  The organization said so in an amicus brief filed in this very case.  The brief notes that 

The claim that same-sex parents produce less positive child outcomes than opposite-sex parents—either because such families lack both a male and female parent or because both parents are not the biological parents of their children—contradicts abundant social science research. Decades of methodologically sound social science research, especially multiple nationally representative studies and the expert evidence introduced in the district courts below, confirm that positive child wellbeing is the product of stability in the relationship between the two parents, stability in the relationship between the parents and child, and greater parental socioeconomic resources. Whether a child is raised by same-sex or opposite-sex parents has no bearing on a child’s wellbeing.

Perhaps even more striking was Justice Scalia’s claim that he takes “no position” on whether same-sex marriage is harmful.

We’ve previously noted this Huffington Post story which points out: 

In his dissent in a 1996 Supreme Court decision overturning a voter-approved, anti-gay referendum in Colorado, Scalia wrote in support of the voter majority, "I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible -- murder, for example, or polygamy or cruelty to animals -- and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct." And in 2003, after the Supreme Court negated a law in Texas that had criminalized same-sex "sodomy," Scalia wrote in dissent, "The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable' -- the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality and obscenity."

 Justice Scalia has an interesting definition of “takes no position.”

Defending the NVRA from the ever-present and persistent specter of state sovereignty

Listen to the excerpt above to hear the comments by Justice Scalia that Prof. Tolson refers to below.  You can hear more excerpts as part of our new AFJ Audio Analysis project.  It's on our website here.
 
By Franita Tolson, 

Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights at

Florida State University College of Law

Arizona’s Proposition 200 requires prospective voters to show proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote in federal elections.  This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments over whether this law interferes with the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), which requires states to accept the federal form for voter registration in federal elections.  This form requires no additional proof of citizenship to register to vote beyond certifying under oath that one is a U.S. citizen.  Under Arizona law, however, voter registration forms that are not accompanied by sufficient proof of U.S. citizenship are rejected. 

Prof. Franita Tolson

Unfortunately, the arguments in the case are premised on the same erroneous assumption that animates most of the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence—that the states, rather than the federal government, are sovereign over elections.  Justice Scalia, for example, criticized Arizona’s counsel for not challenging the federal form given “the refusal…to include on the form as additional State requirements the proof of citizenship.”  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the conflicting voter registration forms for state and federal elections are problematic because “you would end up with two different voter rolls.”   At least implicitly, these justices seem to believe that Congress has to defer to state voter registration requirements because states normally determine voter qualifications in all elections; moreover, congressional interference could lead to administrative chaos.     

Despite the presumption underlying these criticisms of the NVRA, however, the premise of state sovereignty over elections implicitly embraced by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts is only partially correct.  States are, for the most part, sovereign over state elections.  Yet the Constitution’s Elections Clause, by its very terms, deprives them of sovereignty over federal elections.   According to the text, states may choose the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but this authority is subject to Congress’s power to “at any time make or alter such Regulations.”  The Clause, with its initial allocation of power to the states, and its subsequent delegation to Congress of the power to alter state electoral arrangements, deprives the states of the hallmark of sovereign power: final policymaking authority.  While sovereignty is certainly not an uncontested concept in law or politics, the finality of an entity’s decision-making authority is a baseline that the Court has often looked to in determining what “sovereignty” actually entails.  With respect to the Elections Clause, Congress can preempt state law, thereby retaining the final word on federal elections while the states lack similar preemptive authority.

Congress’s power to modify state election laws that govern federal elections should not be understated.  The Framers of the Constitution rejected a congressional negative over all state laws because they believed it would have sharply limited state sovereignty.  The Elections Clause, in their view, represented a compromise of sorts: it gives Congress the ability to veto state laws in a very limited but important circumstance—when the laws apply to federal elections.   The Framers feared that the states would try to cripple the federal government by failing to hold federal elections, and Congress’s ability to “alter or modify” state laws would prevent this situation from occurring.  Given this history, the idea that Congress has to demur to state voter registration requirements in the context of federal elections, as some of the justices presume, is erroneous.  Indeed, the practical reality of compliance with the NVRA may very well mean that a state has to maintain two separate voter registration rolls which, although inconvenient, is not inconsistent with Congress’s authority to demand a separate standard for federal elections.  Similarly, the federal government can refuse to incorporate additional state qualifications into its registration form for federal elections.  The Elections Clause makes it pretty clear that Congress, and not the states, has the last word on regulations that affect federal elections. 

Franita Tolson is the Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights at the Florida State University College of Law.  Her previous post to this Blog discusses the oral argument in Shelby County V. Holder, the case challenging Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

The OTHER voting rights case reaches the Supreme Court

The legal issues are different; the stakes are similar

The first thing Jesus Gonzalez did after completing the naturalization ceremony that made him an American citizen in 2005 was to try to exercise the most fundamental right of citizenship: the right to vote.

He filled out a voter registration form correctly. He provided the number for his certificate of naturalization. He signed an oath, under penalty of perjury, that he was a citizen. In short, he did everything the United States requires to register to vote in federal elections.

But Mr. Gonzalez had just become a citizen in Arizona, a state that keeps trying to put up barriers to poor people and people of color when they try to vote. In 2012, the state became notorious for its voter suppression efforts. But those efforts actually began long before this past election.

In 2004, Arizona passed a referendum which added burdensome state requirements beyond the simple guidelines in federal law. So the state turned Gonzalez down. He tried again, this time using his driver’s license number. But the state said the license was too old, and turned him down again. Finally, Mr. Gonzalez paid what amounts to a de facto poll tax: $112.95 to get a passport, in order to provide proof of citizenship.

He is not alone. Since the Arizona law took effect, more than 30,000 people had their voter registration forms rejected, without any evidence that the applicants were illegitimate. Today, they get their day in court.

At issue is the National Voter Registration Act, a law passed 20 years ago to provide a standardized, simple way for Americans to register to vote in federal elections. The law provides for a form prospective voters can fill out and mail to state boards of elections. States are required to "accept and use" the form. The law also requires the form be made easily available in many offices, including Departments of Motor Vehicles. That's how the law became known as the "motor voter" law.

The law was challenged by groups ranging from the Arizona Hispanic Community Forum to Common Cause and the League of Women Voters. Jesus Gonzalez is one of the plaintiffs in the suit, State of Arizona et. al., v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., et. al.

A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals threw out the law. They said the federal law takes precedence and states have no right to add their own requirements. One of the judges was retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. (Retired Supreme Court justices sometimes hear cases in lower federal courts.) The full 9th Circuit meeting en banc – that is, with all of the judges hearing the case – affirmed that decision.

When it passed "motor voter," Congress made clear it had no interest in the kind of stunt Arizona is trying to pull. Congress specifically rejected an amendment to allow states to do what Arizona now is doing anyway - requiring people to submit documents proving their citizenship, documents that often are difficult for poor people, the elderly, new citizens, and active-duty military to provide. If Arizona wins in the Supreme Court, it could encourage other states to throw up similar roadblocks.

As always when a state seeks to suppress the rights of poor people and people of color to vote, the effort is cloaked in the mantle of curbing "voter fraud." But this kind of fraud – in which people who have no right to vote show up at the polls and vote anyway – is nearly nonexistent. And there is no evidence that the form provided under the motor voter law ever has been used to register fraudulently.

Perhaps most important, the Constitution is absolutely clear about where authority lies. It says Congress has the right to determine the "times places and manner" of federal elections.

In another case involving voting, Justice Scalia made headlines last month, suggesting that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which he called a "racial entitlement," should be overturned because he could read the minds of members of Congress when they reauthorized the law by nearly unanimous votes – and he didn't like what he imagined those members of Congress were thinking. Here, Congress clearly rejected a proposal to allow states to pass additional requirements that would surpass the basic guidelines of the NVRA.

So upholding the 9th Circuit and striking down the Arizona law should be an easy call.

"We should all have a right to vote in this country," says Jesus Gonzalez. "I want to have a voice in the United States."

Soon we'll know if the Supreme Court will do its duty and allow American citizens their right to "a voice in the United States" or if the majority will help Arizona try to silence that voice.

Hear NPR's story about the case.

Shameful echoes of Scalia

Curt Levey

In a front page story in the Washington Post today, Alliance for Justice President Nan Aron, among others, discusses the progress made toward a more diverse judiciary under President Obama. The story also included Coalition for Justice President Curt Levey’s shameful insinuation that the Administration might have “a lower threshold of qualifications for minorities.” Not only does Levey’s sentiment mirror Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s notorious “racial entitlement” language last week in the Voting Rights Act oral argument, it is outright false.

Each and every federal court nominee put forward under President Obama – whether a white male or an African-American woman – has been rated qualified or well-qualified to serve as a federal judge by the American Bar Association. And rather than facing a “lower threshold,” a study by University of Rochester professor Maya Sen shows that the ABA systematically holds women and minorities to a higher standard than white men. In other words, with all other objective qualifications equal, the ABA has given harsher ratings to women and minorities than to their otherwise identical white male counterparts.

The facts clearly reflect that President Obama’s movement toward a judiciary that more closely resembles America has brought both diverse and exceptional nominees to a Senate which has delayed far too long in confirming them.  Levey’s insulting accusation is an affront to the nominees, to the president, and to the American people, who have long since moved past these sorts of racial canards.

Read more about President Obama’s federal court nominees and impact on the judiciary.

Perhaps it depends on the definition of “views”

During a discussion at Southern Methodist University, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia maintained that “I haven’t expressed my views” on gay marriage or gun control.

But, as The Huffington Post points out:

In his dissent in a 1996 Supreme Court decision overturning a voter-approved, anti-gay referendum in Colorado, Scalia wrote in support of the voter majority, "I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible -- murder, for example, or polygamy or cruelty to animals -- and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct."

And in 2003, after the Supreme Court negated a law in Texas that had criminalized same-sex "sodomy," Scalia wrote in dissent, "The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable' -- the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality and obscenity."

So, is Antonin Scalia against gay marriage? You might well think that.  He couldn’t possibly comment.

Two more perspectives on the Supreme Court and gun control

● Jeffrey Toobin, in The New Yorker, on how members of the extremist majority on the Supreme Court, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, made a mockery of their own professed belief in "originalism" to radically revise the meaning of the Second Amendment:

Does the Second Amendment prevent Congress from passing gun-control laws? The question, which is suddenly pressing, in light of the reaction to the school massacre in Newtown, is rooted in politics as much as law.

Antonin Scalia

For more than a hundred years, the answer was clear, even if the words of the amendment itself were not. The text of the amendment is divided into two clauses and is, as a whole, ungrammatical: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” The courts had found that the first part, the “militia clause,” trumped the second part, the “bear arms” clause. In other words, according to the Supreme Court, and the lower courts as well, the amendment conferred on state militias a right to bear arms—but did not give individuals a right to own or carry a weapon.

Enter the modern National Rifle Association ... [which] pushed for a novel interpretation of the Second Amendment, one that gave individuals, not just militias, the right to bear arms. It was an uphill struggle. At first, their views were widely scorned. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who was no liberal, mocked the individual-rights theory of the amendment as “a fraud.”

But the N.R.A. kept pushing—and there’s a lesson here. Conservatives often embrace “originalism,” the idea that the meaning of the Constitution was fixed when it was ratified, in 1787. They mock the so-called liberal idea of a “living” constitution, whose meaning changes with the values of the country at large. But there is no better example of the living Constitution than the conservative re-casting of the Second Amendment in the last few decades of the twentieth century. ... 

Read the full article here

And hear more from Jeffrey Toobin on a range of other issues in our recent conversation with him.

● The New York Times on how the Supreme Court ruling, written by Scalia, strking down the District of Columbia ban on handguns, while not preventing all gun regulation, further emboldened the National Rifle Association:

The N.R.A., emboldened by a Supreme Court ruling asserting an individual constitutional right to bear arms, has turned its attention to further broadening the market, lobbying state legislatures to allow concealed weapons in churches, schools and other public places and to restrict the discretion of local police in granting gun permits.

Read the full editorial here 

Scalia: A round-up of the responses

Antonin Scalia

By now you've probably read Justice Antonin Scalia's appalling comments explaining how he justifies equating laws banning sodomy with those barring bestiality and murder.  (And if you haven't you can catch up with them here.)

Fortunately, there have been some important responses from, among others:

• The New York Times
• The Washington Post
• The Daily Beast
• Salon
• And cartoonist Tom Toles

Of course the most important response will come when all nine justices rule on cases involving the so-called Defense of Marriage Act and Proposition 8.  The night before the Supreme Court decided to take those cases, panelists at AFJ's Conversation with Jeffrey Toobin previewed the issues:

Video highlights from AFJ's Conversation with Jeffrey Toobin

We've put several excerpts from AFJ's Conversation with Jeffrey Toobin on our YouTube page.

In addition to the portion of the discussion dealing with DOMA and Proposition 8 (also available on this Blog here) there's a discussion of the impact of the three women justices on the Supreme Court, and a dialogue about presidents and the court.

There's also the answer to the question: Did Justice Scalia really call Justice Thomas "a nut"?

The entire video is at www.afj.org 

THE VIDEO IS ONLINE NOW: Did you hear the one about what Justice Scalia called Justice Thomas?

If not, it means you missed AFJ's Conversation with Jeffrey Toobin this evening.  But the video is now online at www.afj.org.

Among the other topics: What the court might do, as early as tomorrow, concerning gay rights cases, (that discussion starts about 1 hour and 9 minutes in) why the left does not care as passionately about judges and the courts as the right - and why  that might be about to change - and the paradox of Barack Obama, a former constitutional law professor who put less emphasis on judges than one might expect as president.

As AFJ President Nan Aron pointed out, almost every moment of our lives is shaped by decisions of the Supreme Court.

From left to right: Alliance for Justice President Nan Aron, Jeffrey Toobin,
Emily Bazelon and Prof. Kenji Yoshino

Talking turkey about rubber chicken – and Supreme Court ethics

While most of us still may be thinking about yesterday’s turkey dinner right now, at Alliance for Justice we’re also thinking about ducks – as in “if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck …” and chicken, as in the rubber variety often served at fundraising dinners.

What brings all this poultry to mind is the response of the Federalist Society when Alliance for Justice and Common Cause pointed out that, for the second year in a row, a justice of the United States Supreme Court was headlining its annual fundraising dinner.  Were any other federal judge to do this, it would be a violation of the Code of Conduct for federal judges – but Supreme Court justices are exempt.

The fact that the event was a fundraiser is crucial.  We have no problem with Supreme Court justices speaking at events, even when they are hosted by groups with a strong ideological point of view.  Where they cross the line – and ignore the code of conduct – is when their appearance is used to raise money for the organization.

The Federalist Society response, according to the Associated Press: It’s not a fundraiser.  In fact, they say, they even lose money on every meal. 

That’s a curious response given what one finds on the program for the event.  More than 35 major corporations and prominent law firms are listed as “sponsors” of the event.  There are Bronze Sponsors” like Covington and Burling and the Lincoln Financial Group, “Silver Sponsors,” including Jones Day, Patton Boggs, PepsiCo and Facebook, and “Gold Sponsors,” including Chevron, Verizon and Sullivan & Cromwell.  Topping them all is the “Sponsoring Law Firm,” Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.

So either the hotel where the dinner took place serves the world’s most expensive rubber chicken – or it was a fundraiser.

It’s no wonder that, when the Federalist Society said much the same last year, when Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia headlined the dinner, Matt Wuerker, the Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist for POLITICO didn’t buy it:

(c) Matt Wuerker

 When it comes to the ethics of speaking at a fundraiser, the success of the event doesn’t matter.  As Prof. Stephen Gillers of New York University School of Law explained in an analysis written for AFJ:

It may turn out that the organization is disappointed because the event does not earn a profit. But that is irrelevant. Judges have an obligation in the first instance to assure themselves that the event will not be a fundraiser. 

It all illustrates, once again, why it’s so important to make the provisions of the Code of Conduct binding on Supreme Court justices.  Since it doesn’t appear likely that the justices will do this themselves, Congress should do it for them.

Oops: They're doing it again: Another Supreme Court Justice flouts ethical standards

Alito speaks at Federalist Society fundraiser, following in ethically-challenged footsteps of Scalia and Thomas

AFJ and Common Cause released this statement today:

WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 16 - For the second year in a row, a justice of the Supreme Court has flouted judicial ethics by headlining a fundraising gala for a lawyers group, the Alliance for Justice and Common Cause said Friday.

From the Federalist Society website

Justice Samuel Alito was a featured speaker at the "30th Anniversary Gala Dinner" of the Federalist Society on Thursday night.  Alito’s appearance was the drawing card for the $175-dollar-a-plate event, the society’s website indicates.

Were Justice Alito sitting on any lower federal court, his appearance would violate Canon 4C of the Code of Conduct for federal judges.  That canon explicitly bans federal judges from being featured speakers and guests of honor at fundraising events. The code does not formally apply to the Supreme Court however.

Last year, Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia spoke at the same Federalist Society fundraising event.  The annual dinners attract a crowd of more than 1,200 lobbyists, judges and lawyers, including some with high-profile cases before the court. Attendees at Thursday’s dinner, for example, included at least three lawyers involved in cases challenging the constitutionality of the federal Voting Rights Act. Their Washington-based firm, Wiley Rein LLP, was a “silver” sponsor.

Justice Alito has become a regular at such functions, having previously spoken at fundraising events for the American Spectator magazine and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute.  The Institute describes itself as working for "limited government, individual liberty, personal responsibility, the rule of law, market economy and moral norms."

Alliance for Justice President Nan Aron noted that a 2012 Hart Research Associates poll conducted for AFJ found that only 41% of Americans approve of the job the Supreme Court is doing.  "If the public begins to believe that the justices are just politicians in robes, their credibility will further erode."

"In his 2011 Annual Report, Chief Justice John Roberts claimed that 'All members of the Court do in fact consult the Code of Conduct in assessing their ethical obligations,'" Aron said. "But it is clear that they are free to routinely ignore that guidance.  That’s why guidance is not enough.  Either the justices should formally agree to abide by the Code or Congress should require it."

"The words 'Equal Justice Under Law,' are carved into the marble above the entrance to the Supreme Court," said Common Cause President Bob Edgar, "but it’s clear that when it comes to judicial ethics, some members of the court consider themselves better than equal to the rest of the federal judiciary. Their refusal to embrace and abide by the Code of Conduct is disturbing."

Edgar and Aron emphasized that addressing an organization like the Federalist Society is not, in itself, a breach of ethics.  The ethical line is crossed when the justice’s appearance is used to raise money for the organization.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

From AFJ:

• AFJ Video: A Question of Integrity and background material about ethics issues and the Code of Conduct

• Analysis of the ethical issues involved in Justices Scalia and Thomas speaking at a Federalist Society fundraiser from Prof. Stephen Gillers of New York University School of Law

From Common Cause:

• Our highest court shouldn’t be held to the lowest standard.
• Hours after considering challenges to health care reform, Supreme Court justices are honored at fundraiser sponsored by law firms representing reform opponents.

Right-wing crankiness on full display

In his new book, The Oath: The Obama White House and the Supreme Court, Jeffrey Toobin writes that the dissent Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in a case striking down part of Arizona’s notorious law on immigration (Arizona et. Al. v. United States) "marked his transition from conservative intellectual to right-wing crank." (Writing in Salon, Paul F. Campos has another term for Scalia: "Intellectual fraud.")

The crankiness was on full display last week, when Scalia spoke at the American Enterprise Institute. He discussed some of the toughest issues to face the Court. They are the kinds of cases that prompt many justices, and other Americans in all walks of life, to wrestle with their consciences.

But not Antonin Scalia, who declared:

The death penalty? Give me a break. It's easy. Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the Constitution prevented restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come on. For 200 years, it was criminal in every state.

That we might have become a more civilized nation since the days when death had to be by torture for it to be considered "cruel and unusual" and the days when women effectively were the property of men, is of no concern to Justice Scalia. He prefers to party like it’s 1789.