With the Corporate Court halfway through its 2011-2012 term, we take this opportunity to look back at the opinions that it has issued so far. The Court’s less tendentious rulings tend to be released before the more closely divided ones, so it is unsurprising that all of these cases were decided 9-0 or 8-1. However, the Corporate Court’s unanimity aside, four of these holdings spell bad news for everyday Americans, while two go against corporate interests, and the implications of a final decision remain to be seen.
First, the bad news.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Court held 9-0 that a “ministerial exception” shields religious institutions from liability for discriminatory or retaliatory employment actions. The Court applied a totality of the circumstances test to conclude that the employee in this case – a teacher of primarily secular subjects at a religious school – was a “minister,” and that therefore the ministerial exception applies and her suit is barred. This holding will make it difficult for teachers to speak out against misdeeds within religious institutions for fear of retaliation, and will allow religious institutions to discriminate with impunity.
In Minneci v. Pollard, the Court held 8-1 that employees of a private corporation operating a federal prison may not be held liable under federal law for committing constitutional violations. The plaintiff sued for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, claiming that his Eighth Amendment right not to be cruelly punished had been violated. The Corporate Court held that there is no reason to imply a Bivens remedy because Pollard has an adequate remedy in state tort law. Pollard would clearly have had a Bivens remedy if he were incarcerated in a prison run by the government. Yet because he was placed in a prison run by a private contractor, he is denied that remedy.
In National Meat Association v. Harris, the Corporate Court decided in favor of an industry trade group, holding 9-0 that a California state law designed to protect consumers from contaminated meat and to ensure humane treatment of animals is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. As a result of the Court’s decision, it will be easier for potentially contaminated meat to get into California grocery stores, and more difficult for all states to protect public health and humane treatment of animals.
In Perry v. Perez, the Supreme Court rejected a district court’s attempts to draw interim electoral maps for the upcoming elections, ordering it to give greater deference to the legislature’s racially gerrymandered maps. With pending lawsuits challenging the maps, the San Antonio court designed interim maps to be used during the 2012 electoral season. The Supreme Court rejected the court-drawn maps for failing to defer adequately to the legislature’s choices, and remanded with the instruction to modify the legislature’s maps only where there are alleged legal problems that have a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court’s ruling will likely have the effect of diluting minority voting rights in the 2012 elections.
Now, the good news.
In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, the Court held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act allows a consumer claiming harassment to sue in federal court, reversing the lower courts’ holding that Congress intended to limit jurisdiction to state courts. By siding with Mims, the Supreme Court has provided consumers with the ability to hold companies accountable for unlawful telephone harassment in federal court, where they might receive greater relief than they would in the courts of states with weaker consumer protections.
In a case with narrower application, the Court held in Pacific Operations Offshore v. Valladolid that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act extends workers’ compensation coverage to workers who can show a “substantial nexus” between their injury and their work on the Outer Continental Shelf. As a result, workers in the offshore extractive industries who are injured or killed while working onshore may still receive benefits under the OCSLA if they can show a “substantial nexus” between their injury and operations on the Outer Continental Shelf.
Finally, in the ambiguous category is United States v. Jones, in which the Court addressed the right of individuals to be free from warrantless government tracking of their vehicles’ locations through GPS technology. Although the Court technically ruled against the government, it delivered only a limited victory for privacy rights, holding that the installation and use of a GPS tracker on an automobile constitutes a “search.” Whether or not a warrant is required for such a search remains an open question, and one that will undoubtedly trouble privacy advocates.
The Court returns from its mid-term recess on Tuesday, February 21, when it will hear oral argument in Freeman v. Quicken Loans.
Showing posts with label minneci v. pollard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label minneci v. pollard. Show all posts
Friday, February 17, 2012
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Dean Chemerinsky Highlights New Challenges for Civil Rights Litigants
In a recent ABA Journal article, UC Irvine Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that two generally overlooked cases this term could have broad implications for civil rights litigants’ access to justice. Chemerinsky discusses Minneci v. Pollard and Ryburn v. Huff, arguing that “each reflects a significant, though unstated, change in the law.”
In Minneci, the Court held that employees of a privately-run federal prison cannot be held liable in federal court for constitutional violations because state tort law provides adequate remedies. Chemerinsky writes, “[F]or the first time, the court has said that the existence of state remedies can preclude a Bivens cause of action. In a number of cases, the court had said that the existence of a federal statutory remedy could preclude Bivens actions. But in Bivens, the court had rejected the argument that a state tort remedy was a reason to deny a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.”
In Ryburn, decided without argument or briefing on the merits, the Court held that police officers who entered a home without a warrant and without permission from the occupants were shielded from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. In the 2002 case of Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity can be overcome if an officer’s discretionary actions violate clearly established law that a reasonable officer should know, even if there is not a case directly on point. Chemerinsky notes, “However, in recent cases, without acknowledging it was doing so, the [C]ourt has backed away from Pelzer and found qualified immunity because there was not a specific case on point.” In Ryburn, and last term’s Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, the Court upheld qualified immunity based on the absence of any case on point.
Chemerinsky writes, “The [C]ourt, of course, has not overruled Pelzer. But it is notable that in neither of these cases is it cited; nor does the court focus on, what should be the central inquiry under Pelzer: Did the officer have fair notice that the conduct violated the Constitution? Requiring that the plaintiff have a case on point to overcome qualified immunity will create an obstacle for civil rights plaintiffs in many cases.”
He concludes, “Perhaps the most important theme of the Roberts Court so far has been in making it harder for plaintiffs to go forward in federal court. From a practical perspective, its most significant ruling may be Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 2009 ruling that increased the pleading burden on those wishing to sue in federal court. The two decisions from January fit this pattern and will create new obstacles for civil rights plaintiffs.”
AFJ is greatly concerned about the Roberts Court’s hostility to litigation as a means for everyday Americans to receive compensation for past wrongs and to deter future wrongdoing. Learn more about AFJ’s work on civil justice and the Roberts Court’s history of bending the law to favor corporate interests over everyday Americans.
To read the full article by Dean Chemerinsky, click here.
In Minneci, the Court held that employees of a privately-run federal prison cannot be held liable in federal court for constitutional violations because state tort law provides adequate remedies. Chemerinsky writes, “[F]or the first time, the court has said that the existence of state remedies can preclude a Bivens cause of action. In a number of cases, the court had said that the existence of a federal statutory remedy could preclude Bivens actions. But in Bivens, the court had rejected the argument that a state tort remedy was a reason to deny a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.”
In Ryburn, decided without argument or briefing on the merits, the Court held that police officers who entered a home without a warrant and without permission from the occupants were shielded from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. In the 2002 case of Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity can be overcome if an officer’s discretionary actions violate clearly established law that a reasonable officer should know, even if there is not a case directly on point. Chemerinsky notes, “However, in recent cases, without acknowledging it was doing so, the [C]ourt has backed away from Pelzer and found qualified immunity because there was not a specific case on point.” In Ryburn, and last term’s Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, the Court upheld qualified immunity based on the absence of any case on point.
Chemerinsky writes, “The [C]ourt, of course, has not overruled Pelzer. But it is notable that in neither of these cases is it cited; nor does the court focus on, what should be the central inquiry under Pelzer: Did the officer have fair notice that the conduct violated the Constitution? Requiring that the plaintiff have a case on point to overcome qualified immunity will create an obstacle for civil rights plaintiffs in many cases.”
He concludes, “Perhaps the most important theme of the Roberts Court so far has been in making it harder for plaintiffs to go forward in federal court. From a practical perspective, its most significant ruling may be Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 2009 ruling that increased the pleading burden on those wishing to sue in federal court. The two decisions from January fit this pattern and will create new obstacles for civil rights plaintiffs.”
AFJ is greatly concerned about the Roberts Court’s hostility to litigation as a means for everyday Americans to receive compensation for past wrongs and to deter future wrongdoing. Learn more about AFJ’s work on civil justice and the Roberts Court’s history of bending the law to favor corporate interests over everyday Americans.
To read the full article by Dean Chemerinsky, click here.
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
Corporate Court Finds No Federal Remedy for Constitutional Violations by Private Prison Contractors
The Supreme Court issued its decision today in Minneci v. Pollard (.pdf download), holding that employees of a private corporation operating a federal prison may not be held liable under federal law for committing constitutional violations. In so doing, the Court has left the 16% of the federal prison population that resides in privately-run facilities without a federal remedy when their jailers violate their constitutional rights.
Richard Lee Pollard was incarcerated in a federal prison in Taft, California. The prison was operated under contract by a private company, Wackenhut Corrections Corp. (now part of the Geo Group). In April 2007, Pollard tripped over a cart that had been left in the hallway, fell, and broke both of his elbows. Prison employees forced him to use his broken arms in painful ways, refused to provide the splints recommended by his doctors, and made him engage in prison tasks before his injuries had healed.
Pollard sued both the corporate entity and individual employees for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, claiming that his Eighth Amendment right not to be cruelly punished had been violated. Bivens was a 1971 case in which the Supreme Court created a damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations, where there was no other remedy available.
In today’s decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a Bivens action is available where the only alternative remedy is under state law. The Court followed its 2001 decision in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, in which it held that the prisoner plaintiff could not state a Bivens claim against the private corporate entity running the federal prison in which he was incarcerated. In Malesko, the Court reasoned that a suit against a corporation would not deter individual misconduct, and that the plaintiff could sue under state tort law instead. Although in this case Pollard sued individual Wackenhut employees, the Court nonetheless concluded today that there is no reason to imply a Bivens remedy because, as in Malesko, Pollard can pursue his claims under state tort law.
However, as Justice Ginsburg points out in her lone dissent, Pollard would clearly have had a Bivens remedy if he were incarcerated in a prison run by the government, under the Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green. It is only happenstance that he was placed in a prison run by a private contractor, so he should have the same federal legal remedies available to him as if he were held in a government-run prison.
Justice Ginsburg argues that finding a federal cause of action here would serve the Bivens Court’s interests in the application of uniform federal law to such claims, and in creating a means to deter individuals from violating constitutional rights.
The federal Bureau of Prisons relies increasingly on outsourcing the incarceration of federal prisoners. In addition to the 16% of the federal prison population in privately-run facilities, nearly half of federal immigration detainees are held in privately-run detention facilities. Because private prison contractors have incentives to cut costs in order to maximize their profits, they pay corrections officers less, provide less training, and maintain fewer officers per inmate, as compared to federally-run prisons. As a result, inmates held in privately-held facilities face greater dangers to their health and safety than do other prisoners, and federal oversight of such facilities has been insufficient to correct such shortcomings. Yet today the Court has shut the federal courthouse doors to inmates who suffer as a result of these dangers.
Because the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the corporate employees, inmates who are held in privately-run federal prisons are unable to sue under federal law when their constitutional rights are violated by their jailers.
Richard Lee Pollard was incarcerated in a federal prison in Taft, California. The prison was operated under contract by a private company, Wackenhut Corrections Corp. (now part of the Geo Group). In April 2007, Pollard tripped over a cart that had been left in the hallway, fell, and broke both of his elbows. Prison employees forced him to use his broken arms in painful ways, refused to provide the splints recommended by his doctors, and made him engage in prison tasks before his injuries had healed.
Pollard sued both the corporate entity and individual employees for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, claiming that his Eighth Amendment right not to be cruelly punished had been violated. Bivens was a 1971 case in which the Supreme Court created a damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations, where there was no other remedy available.
In today’s decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a Bivens action is available where the only alternative remedy is under state law. The Court followed its 2001 decision in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, in which it held that the prisoner plaintiff could not state a Bivens claim against the private corporate entity running the federal prison in which he was incarcerated. In Malesko, the Court reasoned that a suit against a corporation would not deter individual misconduct, and that the plaintiff could sue under state tort law instead. Although in this case Pollard sued individual Wackenhut employees, the Court nonetheless concluded today that there is no reason to imply a Bivens remedy because, as in Malesko, Pollard can pursue his claims under state tort law.
However, as Justice Ginsburg points out in her lone dissent, Pollard would clearly have had a Bivens remedy if he were incarcerated in a prison run by the government, under the Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green. It is only happenstance that he was placed in a prison run by a private contractor, so he should have the same federal legal remedies available to him as if he were held in a government-run prison.
Justice Ginsburg argues that finding a federal cause of action here would serve the Bivens Court’s interests in the application of uniform federal law to such claims, and in creating a means to deter individuals from violating constitutional rights.
The federal Bureau of Prisons relies increasingly on outsourcing the incarceration of federal prisoners. In addition to the 16% of the federal prison population in privately-run facilities, nearly half of federal immigration detainees are held in privately-run detention facilities. Because private prison contractors have incentives to cut costs in order to maximize their profits, they pay corrections officers less, provide less training, and maintain fewer officers per inmate, as compared to federally-run prisons. As a result, inmates held in privately-held facilities face greater dangers to their health and safety than do other prisoners, and federal oversight of such facilities has been insufficient to correct such shortcomings. Yet today the Court has shut the federal courthouse doors to inmates who suffer as a result of these dangers.
Because the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the corporate employees, inmates who are held in privately-run federal prisons are unable to sue under federal law when their constitutional rights are violated by their jailers.
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Supreme Court Hears Case On Constitutional Rights in Outsourced Prisons
Today the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Minneci v. Pollard, a case about whether employees of a private corporation operating a federal prison may be held liable under federal law for committing constitutional violations. Petitioners are asking the Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s holding that claims may be asserted against the employees of privately-run federal prisons.
Richard Lee Pollard was incarcerated in a federal prison in Taft, California. The prison was operated under contract by a private company, Wackenhut Corrections Corp. (now part of the Geo Group). In April 2007, Pollard tripped over a cart that had been left in the hallway, fell, and broke both of his elbows. Prison employees forced him to use his broken arms in painful ways, refused to provide the splints recommended by his doctors, and made him engage in prison tasks before his injuries had healed.
Pollard sued both the corporate entity and individual employees for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, claiming that his Eighth Amendment right not to be cruelly punished had been violated. Bivens was a 1971 case in which the Supreme Court created a damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations, where there was no other remedy available.
The district court rejected Pollard’s claims against the corporation, based upon the Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Correction Services Corp. v. Malesko that private prison corporations cannot be sued under Bivens. The district court also dismissed Pollard’s claims against the individual employees on the grounds that they were not acting in any official capacity when Pollard was injured, and that Pollard had the alternative remedy of suing for damages under California law.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision as to the individual employees, ruling that the corporate employees were acting officially because they were carrying out a “fundamentally governmental function.” (The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the corporation itself could not be sued under Malesko). The Ninth Circuit held that the inquiry under Bivens is whether an alternative federal remedy is available; where the only alternative remedy is under state law, a Bivens action may be maintained.
The federal Bureau of Prisons relies increasingly on outsourcing the incarceration of federal prisoners. In 2009, approximately 16% of the federal prison population resided in privately-run facilities. Additionally, nearly half of federal immigration detainees are held in privately-run detention facilities.
Because private prison contractors have incentives to cut costs in order to maximize their profits, they pay corrections officers less, provide less training, and maintain fewer officers per inmate than federally-run prisons. As a result, inmates held in privately-held facilities face greater dangers to their health and safety than do other prisoners, and federal oversight of such facilities has been insufficient to correct such shortcomings. Yet petitioners seek to limit the ability of inmates to seek recompense when they suffer as a result of these dangers.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the corporate employees, inmates who are held in privately-run federal prisons will be unable to sue under federal law when their constitutional rights are violated by their jailers.
Richard Lee Pollard was incarcerated in a federal prison in Taft, California. The prison was operated under contract by a private company, Wackenhut Corrections Corp. (now part of the Geo Group). In April 2007, Pollard tripped over a cart that had been left in the hallway, fell, and broke both of his elbows. Prison employees forced him to use his broken arms in painful ways, refused to provide the splints recommended by his doctors, and made him engage in prison tasks before his injuries had healed.
Pollard sued both the corporate entity and individual employees for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, claiming that his Eighth Amendment right not to be cruelly punished had been violated. Bivens was a 1971 case in which the Supreme Court created a damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations, where there was no other remedy available.
The district court rejected Pollard’s claims against the corporation, based upon the Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Correction Services Corp. v. Malesko that private prison corporations cannot be sued under Bivens. The district court also dismissed Pollard’s claims against the individual employees on the grounds that they were not acting in any official capacity when Pollard was injured, and that Pollard had the alternative remedy of suing for damages under California law.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision as to the individual employees, ruling that the corporate employees were acting officially because they were carrying out a “fundamentally governmental function.” (The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the corporation itself could not be sued under Malesko). The Ninth Circuit held that the inquiry under Bivens is whether an alternative federal remedy is available; where the only alternative remedy is under state law, a Bivens action may be maintained.
The federal Bureau of Prisons relies increasingly on outsourcing the incarceration of federal prisoners. In 2009, approximately 16% of the federal prison population resided in privately-run facilities. Additionally, nearly half of federal immigration detainees are held in privately-run detention facilities.
Because private prison contractors have incentives to cut costs in order to maximize their profits, they pay corrections officers less, provide less training, and maintain fewer officers per inmate than federally-run prisons. As a result, inmates held in privately-held facilities face greater dangers to their health and safety than do other prisoners, and federal oversight of such facilities has been insufficient to correct such shortcomings. Yet petitioners seek to limit the ability of inmates to seek recompense when they suffer as a result of these dangers.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the corporate employees, inmates who are held in privately-run federal prisons will be unable to sue under federal law when their constitutional rights are violated by their jailers.
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